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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper summarizes theoretical arguments, empirical evidence, and econometric findings to 
support the statement that rational economic policies depend qualitatively on stages of 
development that are defined by productivity and institutional indicators of a country. We consider 
the impact of industrial policies, speed of foreign exchange reserves accumulation, technology 
transfers and immigration policies, as well as FDI and liberalization of capital flows, on rate of 
economic growth. It is argued that the impact may be positive or negative; in many cases a 
threshold combination of GDP per capita and institutional quality indicators may be found to 
separate two different outcomes. A precondition of economic success is the timely switching of 
economic policies to avoid both types of mistakes: excessive inertia or premature use of 
instruments that are effective for more advance countries only.  
    The stage of development theory implies that  international financial institutions (including IMF, 
WB, and EBRD) should  work out a list of differentiated prescriptions that may be efficiently 
followed by countries with different levels of institutional and technological development, and so 
the system of assistance to developing countries could be improved. This and some other elements 
of "a New World Economic Order" are discussed in the paper.  
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1. Introduction 
         
Rational economic policy has to depend on the level of economic and social development of a 
country. This statement seems to be quite trivial.  Up to the middle of 1990s, however, most of 
research devoted to institutional and policy reform implicitly assumed that a developing country 
has to move along a strict line connecting a current point and an ideal point in institutional space. 
In most cases the modern USA economy was set up as a model. Price liberalization, privatization, 
financial market deregulation, and elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers were 
unconditionally recommended to all developing and transition economies. No distinctions were 
made between Latin America, Africa or East Europe. The discussion concentrated around the 
speed of these changes. 
   The outcome of these recipes has been disappointing. Per capita GDP for Latin America and 
Caribbean countries decreased by an average 0.8 percent per year in the 1980s, and grew by mere 
1.5 percent per year in the 1990s. In the Middle East and North Africa we observed the average 
fall of 1.0 percent per year in the 1980s and the average growth of 1.0 percent per year in 
the1990s.  For 28 countries of East Europe and former USSR, the total loss of GDP amounted to 
30% in the 1990s.  In Sub-Sahara Africa there was a reduction if the GDP per capita.  
  It is now widely accepted that the most important causes of the recession were the weakness of 
the new market institutions and the low quality of governance and that the role of government was 
underestimated (World Bank (1997), Stiglitz (1998), Popov (2000). A number of recent empirical 
studies have shown that the recommendations mentioned above could not be considered as 
universal recipes. Privatization does not necessary entail restructuring and increase in efficiency. 
Deregulation may cause financial crises. A thorough analysis of statistical data does not reveal any 
positive connection between trade liberalization openness and growth (Rodrik, 2003). A possible 
conclusion is an agnostic view: only general principles like a necessity of market oriented 
incentives, economic stability, and property right enforcement merit to be beliefs; each country is 
unique, therefore concrete policy recommendations can not be extracted from theoretical 
considerations or data analysis (Rodrik, 2003).   
  A different approach is based on the presumption that there exists a link between a set of 
technological, institutional and cultural indicators and rational economic policy. The absence of 
general universal recipes means that what may be good for developed countries is not necessarily 
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good for developing ones. Elimination of tariff or subsidies to producers, liberalization of capital 
flows and deregulation of domestic financial markets, strengthening government control and 
promotion of competition may be good or bad for an economy depending on its stage of 
development. 
   There are four general methodologies to support this statement and to reveal how a rational 
policy depends on economic and institutional variables. First, past experience of now-developed 
countries may be very useful. In a recent book Chang (2002) argue that most Western economies 
at some stages of their development relied heavily on industrial policies, and did not follow either 
today’s standards of openness or patent law, protection of environment and human rights. 
Advocating the acceptance of these standards in less wealthy parts of the world, and even 
threatening developing countries with economic sanctions in case they refuse to accept such 
standards, the West, whatever the good intentions may be, de facto preserves the backwardness of 
poorer economies “kicking away the ladder” by which developed countries climbed to their 
prosperity.  
 Second, comparisons of economic policies of a few countries that recently reached their catching 
up goals and much more numerous set of less successful economies are very useful (see, in 
particular, Kuznets (1988), Rodrik (1995), Nam (1995), Cho et all (1996), Hayamy (1996), Lee 
(1998),  Oian (1999)). Following this line of research Rodric (1995) concludes that the East Asia 
miracle countries were much more gradual in the use of Western policy standards than Latin 
American economies. Author cited above describe how Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China changed 
their policies in the process of development. It turns out that the sequences of the changes were 
very similar for all these countries.  
  Third, there are several theoretical developments that try to explain connections between 
economic policies and stages of development1. Two recent papers by Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti 
(2002a, b) are particularly important. The authors offer a model to demonstrate the dependence of 
economic policies on the distance to the technological frontier. They assume that a change of a 
country technological level is equal to the weighted sum of technological change due to imitations 
and innovations. The speed of imitation is fixed whereas the speed of innovation is larger for more 
advanced economies. The experience of new managers is most important for imitations, whereas 
                                                          
1 Note that these connections were not studied systematically in the classical theory of the stages of economic 
growth suggested by Walt W. Rostow.   
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their talents are crucial for innovation. If the distance to the technological frontier is large, the 
economy would be better off giving managers long-term contracts that would lead to imitation and 
investment based growth. But once the economy approaches the technological frontier and 
innovation yields greater returns than imitation, the life-time employment system should be 
replaced by the competitive selection. It is argued also that the optimal size of firms is an 
increasing function of the distance to frontier. 
  Fourth approach systematically used in Polterovich, Popov (2003, 2004, 2005) is based on 
econometric calculations aimed to reveal threshold levels that separate efficiency areas of different 
economic policies. A general idea is to run regressions of the following shape 
GR = Control variables  + bX(a -Y), 
where GR is rate of growth (or another outcome indicator); X is a policy variable (level of tariffs, 
speed of foreign exchange reserves accumulation, etc.); b, a  are regression coefficients; and Y is a 
characteristics of stage of development of a country (GDP per capita, an institutional indicator or 
their combinations). Obviously, an increase of variable X has positive impact on GR if Y<a, and 
negative impact if Y>a. A threshold level, a, defines a switching point.  
   Below we summarize results showing how efficiency of different policies depends on GDP per 
capita and institutional indicators. Then we formulate a hypothesis that different policies are 
interconnected so that one can say on policy sets related to different stages of development. 
Evolution of economic policies in Japan and Korea seems to support this hypothesis. In the last 
section it is argued that international expert society has to differentiate standards of proper political 
and economic institutions and policies and work out a list of requirements that may be demanded 
to governments dependently on the development levels of their countries. This may substantially 
improve assistance institutions and norm of interactions between developed and developing 
worlds.  
   
1. Industrial policy, protectionism and export orientation 
   It is quite standard to consider import substitution and export oriented policies as two 
incompatible alternatives. In 1950-th and 1960-th many economists supported import substitution 
policies. After 1980-th, outward orientation is usually considered as “a necessary condition for 
rapid economic growth” (Krueger (1995)). However, recent empirical studies (see Rodriguez and 
Rodrik, 1999, and Williamson, 2002, for surveys) did not find any conclusive evidence that free 
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trade is always good for growth. Moreover, some students of the history of the economic policies 
point out that the most successful economies implemented both kinds of policies the same time. 
Hayami writes: “At least until the 1960s in Japan and until the 1980s in Korea and Taiwan, export-
promotion policies were superimposed on the import-substitution policies rather than replacing 
them” (Hayami (1995, p.21)). With respect to Japan, a similar observation is made by Nam (1995, 
p. 168). 
   The absence of the conclusive evidence on whether free trade is good for growth may be 
associated with the fact that the impact of lower trade barriers on growth depends upon the level of 
development and quality of institutions. An attempt to check this hypothesis was done in 
Polterovich, Popov (2004).  Using Corruption perception index (CPI) for 1980-85 and the data of 
World Development Indicators we construct our own measure of corruption. First, we regress the 
actual CPI on PPP GDP per capita2 and take the residual (a measure of "abundant" corruption); 
second, we subtract this residual from 10 to have a residual positive corruption index (the higher 
the index, the greater the corruption): 
CORRres = 10 – [CPI – (2.3 + 0.00082*Ycap75)] = 12.3 – CPI + 0. 00082*Ycap75,       (1) 
where CORRres is residual positive corruption index, CPI – actual average corruption perception 
index in 1980-85 from Transparency International, Ycap75 - GDP per capita at 1975. 
Using CORRres , we test how tariffs affect growth.  The best equation we found was the 
following: 
 
GR = CONST.+CONTR.VAR.+Tincr.(0.06–0.0004Ycap75us–0.004CORRpos–0.005T), (2) 
 
where the dependent variable, GR, is the annual average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99, 
the control variables are population growth rates during the period and net fuel imports (to control 
for “resource curse”), T – average import tariff as a % of import in 1975-99, Tincr. – increase in 
the level of this tariff (average tariff in 1980-99 as a % of average tariff in 1971-80),  
Ycap75us – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level. Here R2=40%, N=39, all 
coefficients are significant at 5% level, except the last one, but exclusion of the last term (a 
multiple of T by Tincr.) does not ruin the regression and the coefficients do not change much.  
                                                          
2 The regression equation is  CPI = 2.3 + 0,00082*Ycap75, N=45, R2 =59%, T-statistics for Ycap75 coefficient 
is 9. 68.  
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Regression (2) demonstrates the existence of threshold for a linear combination of three variables:  
0.0004Ycap75us+ 0.004CORRpos+0.005T.  At lower than threshold levels the impact of the 
increase in tariff protection on economic growth is positive, whereas at higher than threshold levels 
the impact of protectionist policies is negative. The threshold levels are such that for poor 
countries (GDP per capita at below 50% of the US level), but with relatively low corruption 
(below 10, whereas CORRpos varies from 6 to 13) and low initial levels of tariff protection, 
growth can be stimulated by the increase in import tariffs. For wealthier and/or more corrupt 
countries the impact of tariffs on growth is negative.  
     WTO rules prohibiting increases in protection of domestic markets, except for special 
circumstances, may thus actually be destructive for developing countries. Not to speak about most 
appalling cases, such as subsidies to agricultural producers in Western countries. These subsidies 
amounted to $14,000 per farmer a year in EU and to $20,000 per farmer in the US (2000, OECD 
estimate) – this makes it simply impossible for the farmers from developing countries to compete 
with the heavily subsidized agricultural products from EU and the US. EU support to agriculture is 
equivalent to double the combined aid budgets of the European Commission and all 15 member 
states. Sugar production costs in Europe are among the world’s highest, but EU is the second 
largest world exporter due to subsidies to European producers allowing them to sell sugar at three 
times the international price (Bailey, Fowler, Watkins, 2002). Overall, according to the World 
Bank estimate, rich countries spend more than 300 billion a year in agricultural subsidies, which 
exceeds total official development assistance of rich countries by a fraction of six and is roughly 
equivalent to nearly 2% of PPP GDP of the developing countries.    
 
3. Foreign exchange reserve accumulation 
  
    At the stage of industrialization many countries followed import substitution policies and kept 
their real exchange rate (RER) overvalued (Rodrik (1986)). Switching to the export promotion 
policies, fast growing countries usually have undervalued RER (ceteris paribus lower ratio of 
domestic to US prices). The influence of RER on economic growth was studied in a number of 
researches. The results are controversial. Rodrik (2003) believes that large real exchange rate 
devaluation has played a big role in some of the more recent growth accelerations, notably in Chile 
and Botswana. Dollar (1992) and Easterly (1999) includes variables that characterize the 
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undervaluation of RER into standard growth regressions and show that overvaluation is 
detrimental for economic growth of developing countries. However, Calvo, Reinhart and Vegh 
(1995) argue that undervaluation of the exchange rate is inflationary in theory and was inflationary 
in practice for Latin American countries in the 1980s, and therefore had rather negative impact 
(see also Kamin,  Rogers (2000)).  
  A RER devaluation may be reached by different instruments that can influence differently on 
economic performance. Therefore, in Polterovich, Popov (2004) we concentrated on accumulation 
of foreign exchange reserves (FER) that is the most powerful means of the RER control. It turns 
out that fast FER accumulation is a typical policy for quickly developing countries (see Table 1 
and Fig. 1). Empirical evidence seem to suggest that the accumulation of foreign exchange 
reserves (FER) contributes to economic growth of developing economies by increasing both the 
investment/GDP ratio and capital productivity. This is not the case for developed economies, 
however. Therefore the following hypothesis was put forward: fast FER accumulation may 
accelerate economic growth only if a country does not reach a threshold level of GDP per capita.  
  To check this hypothesis we used the indicator of the policy-induced changes in reserves where 
the impact of the objective factors (GDP per capita and trade to GDP ratio) on the reserves to GDP 
ratio is netted out. First, we computed the regression linking the increase in the reserves/GDP ratio 
in 1975-99 to initial (1975) GDP per capita, average ratio of foreign trade to GDP over the period 
and the increase in the same ratio over the period ( )/(24.0)/(1.0lg4.1138 YTYTYR ∆++−=∆ , 
R2=34%, N=82, all coefficients significant at 0.1% level). Then we considered the residual ∆Rpol 
as the policy-induced change in reserves. The logic behind such an approach was to net out 
changes in reserve/GDP ratio caused by objective circumstances, such as the level of development 
and the level and dynamics of foreign trade. Afterwards we used the policy induced change in 
foreign exchange reserves as one of the explanatory variables in growth regressions. In this way 
we deal with the possible endogeneity  problem: policy-induced change in reserve to GDP ratio in 
1975-99 could be regarded as a exogenous policy variable.  
 
One of the results is the following.   
GR = CONST.+CONTR.VAR.+ 0.1∆Rpol(66.7– Ycap75us), (3) 
where the dependent variable, GR, is the annual average growth rate of GDP per capita in 1975-99, 
the control variables are population growth rates during, the period, residual positive corruption 
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index CORRres (see (1)), and Ycap75us – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level 
(signs of all corresponding coefficients are negative).Here R2=49%, N=40, all coefficients are 
significant at 5% level. 
 Equation (3) implies that accumulation of reserves stimulates growth in relatively poor countries, 
but the impact of this policy is getting smaller and smaller as countries approach the threshold 
level of GDP per capita. It is equal to 67% of the US level.  Thus accumulation of reserves in 
relatively rich countries is detrimental to economic growth3.   
  Some countries use tariff and the same time quickly accumulate FER. We  have run a number of 
regressions with these two types of policies. Thresholds for tariffs were always lower than FER 
thresholds. Thus for countries like Chile and Korea the appropriate policy since 1975 was to lower 
import duties, whereas for poorer countries elimination of trade barriers was at that stage 
premature. On the contrary, the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves was good for middle 
income countries (for developed countries the marginal impact of such a policy was miniscule or 
even negative). The reason that “exchange rate protectionism” is more efficient policy to stimulate 
growth in middle income countries than import duties is probably the indiscriminate non-selective 
nature of low exchange rate policy: tariff protection is prone to lobbying pressure whereas 
exchange rate undervaluation via reserve accumulation is not. This makes it especially efficient 
growth promoting instrument in middle income countries that generally suffer from corruption . 
  The positive influence of fast FER accumulation is a puzzle since, at the first glance, it results in 
pure losses. Why do not spend the abundant reserves to increase consumption or investment? A 
modification of AK endogenous growth model developed in Polterovich, Popov (2004) answers 
this question: fast FER accumulation may accelerate growth due to externalities that influence 
knowledge accumulation in the economy. If the export sector externality dominates in the 
knowledge accumulation, then, in accordance to the logic of AK-models, the FER accumulation 
both decrease RER and accelerate growth. Moreover, under some more restrictive conditions, it 
may also increase discounted utility value even if the accumulated reserves do not earn any interest 
and can not be used in the future. If, however, the import externality prevails and FER build up 
attracts large inflow of foreign direct investments (due to signaling of low risk) then the FER 
                                                          
3 It would be preferable to get a regression with two thresholds to explain why very pure countries do not 
accumulate abundant FER. We were not able to get it, probably, due to insufficient size of our sample.  
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accumulation may accelerate growth by increase of RER. Of cause, abundant FER accumulation is 
always a second best policy. It is used, instead of tariffs or subsidies, to avoid distorting lobbing.    
   In practical terms, there are no formal limits for the accumulation of reserves by developing 
countries, but “exchange rate protectionism” can result in “beggar-thy-neighbor policies” – 
obviously all countries cannot exercise these policies at the same time. The Plaza Accord of 1985 
involved the coordinated efforts of major Western countries to appreciate their currencies against 
the dollar in order to reduce the US trade deficit. Japan and Korea were forced to appreciate their 
currencies as well.  Afterwards both economies experienced long depression. 
 
4. Imitation versus innovation and protection of the intellectual property. 
   To what extent should a developing country rely upon the technology transfer from the West, 
and what should be its own innovation efforts?   To answer this question, a number of regressions 
were  run in Polterovich, Popov (2003). There were just 28 observation for 1980-99 period because 
of limited data on technology transfers, so regressions included only a few variables. A typical 
result is as follows: 
GR = CONST.+CONTR.VAR.+ 0.115TT (20.8– Ycap75us  + 0.27R&D), (4) 
where Ycap75us – PPP GDP per capita in 1975 as a % of the US level, TT – average technology 
imports, R&D – average research and development expenditure as percentage of  
GDP .  Investment climate index and average investment/GDP ratio in 1975-99 were used as 
control variables. All coefficients are significant at 5% level.  
   Equation (4) shows that imports of technology is unambiguously good for relatively poor 
countries (with  Ycap75us, < 20.8% of the US level in 1975 - level of Colombia and Turkey), but 
in the process of  development  it should be more and more supplemented with own research in 
order to have a positive impact on performance.  This conclusion is supported by theoretical 
researches (Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti (2002a), Polterovich, Tonis (2005)) that stress the 
importance of imitation for developing countries. However effective imitation may be hampered 
due to strong system intellectual property rights protection.  
     TRIPs (trade related intellectual property) rules that resulted from WTO agreements require the 
protection of patents for no less than 20 years and the protection of copyrights for no less than 50 
years. Many authors have cast serious doubt upon the usefulness of stricter protection of 
intellectual property rights (Chang, 2001; Boldrin, Levine, 2002). Sakakibara and Bransletter 
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(2001) studied the 1998 Japanese patent law reforms and did not find any evidence of its positive 
impact. These and a number of other results “…raise the possibility that strengthened intellectual 
property rights have led to the socially wasteful accumulation of defensive patent portfolios.” 
(Sakakibara and Bransletter (2001, p. 99)).  
   Even if there is a need to protect intellectual property rights, there is no reason to force 
developing countries to protect them as strict as developed countries do. There seems to be an 
agreement that the accelerated development of the poor countries is a priority for the world and for 
the rich countries in particular (since it reduces the threat of terrorism, for example). There seems 
to be a consensus among economists and policymakers that the transfer of technology to the poor 
countries is the most efficient way of assistance. Yet, the TRIPS agreements are undoubtedly 
limiting the transfer of technology to the South. Moreover, TRIPS are making it more difficult for 
the poor countries to develop not only in economic, but also in social terms. Copyrights hinder the 
dissemination of information, knowledge and culture, whereas patents on pharmaceutical products 
limit the ability of the poor countries to fight diseases and decrease mortality. It is only in cases of 
national emergency, such as a really bad AIDS epidemic in South Africa, that drugs can be 
purchased/produced with no regard to patent protection.  
   Current WTO practice links the access to Western markets to the protection of intellectual 
property rights. Developing countries thus find themselves between the rock and the hard place: 
either the access to Western markets with no easy transfer of technology, or easy transfer of 
technology without any access to the Western markets.  
   This system should be changed. A special UN Intellectual property right commission has to be 
created to work out recommendation on the terms of patent and copyrights protection. The terms 
have to be differentiated for a broad spectrum of innovation dependently on the development level 
of a country.   
 
5. FDI and liberalization of capital flows. 
   It is widely accepted that the inflows of FDI that are not volatile and that are often the most 
efficient channels for the new technology transfers, are good for developing countries. With 
respect to portfolio and especially to short term capital flows, the balance of costs and benefits is 
much less clear. 
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  There is no evidence that the free movement of short term capital promotes economic growth 
(Stiglitz, 2000; Griffith-Jones, Montes, Nasution, 2001; Singh, 2002). Whereas the conventional 
wisdom before Asian 1997 currency crises recommended full liberalization of capital accounts, 
today’s consensus, if any, leans towards the understanding that cost associated with free short-term 
capital flows  are too high, while benefits are not obvious (Montes, Popov, 1999). The IMF has 
admitted that forcing developing countries to open their markets to foreign investors could increase 
the risk of financial crises. "The process of capital account liberalization appears to have been 
accompanied in some cases by increased vulnerability to crises," the fund said in a report (Prasad 
et al. 2003). 
    It may be hypothesized that the FDI inflows into countries with poor investment climate do 
actually more harm than good. First, there is a self-selection of investors – if the investment 
climate is bad, foreign investors come mostly for short term profit and/or resource projects, where 
the transfer of technology, the main benefit of FDI, is at best limited. Second, foreign investors do 
not reinvest profits in countries with poor investment climate, so the outflow of profits with time 
outweighs the inflow of FDI. Third, purchases of companies in countries with bad investment 
conditions do not necessarily lead to the increase in total investment because the inflow of FDI is 
often completely absorbed by an outflow of short term capital. 
   Regression below (Polterovich, Popov (2003)) supports these conclusions. It implies that FDI 
positively influence growth in countries with good investment climate and negatively – in 
countries with poor investment climate: 
GR = CONST. + CONTR. VAR. + 0.02*FDI (ICI –80.5), (5) 
where ICI – investment climate index, FDI – average foreign direct investment inflow as a % of 
GDP in 1980-99. Coefficients are significant at 10% level. 
    Equation (5) gives a very high threshold of investment climate index – about 80%, which is 
basically the level of developed countries. Only a few developing countries (Botswana, Hong 
Kong, Kuwait) have such a good investment climate. The worse is investment climate of a country 
the larger may be losses from FDI, hence, the stronger foreign investments should be  regulated by 
the state.  
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6. Migration policy 
The most important restrictions and barriers that remain in the world economy today are not those 
in international trade and capital flows, but in the movement of people across national borders. In 
words of Dani Rodrik, “if international policy makers were really interested in maximizing 
worldwide efficiency, they would spend little of their energies on a new trade round or on the 
international financial architecture. They would all be busy at work liberalizing immigration 
restrictions” (Rodrik, 2001).    
   Compared to 100 years ago, the world is much less globalized today in terms of the free flow of 
labor. Annual migration flows right before the first world war – about 2 million people a year – 
were actually no less significant than now in absolute terms and about 4 times more intensive (as a 
% of the population) than now (Williamson, 2002). The pressure for immigration, however, did 
not decrease – differences in wage levels in 2000 ranged from $32 per hour in Germany to 25 
cents in India, whereas the progress in the means of transportation and communications obviously 
reduced the costs of immigration dramatically. To put it differently, the decrease in the 
international migration in recent 100 years is due primarily to the tightening of the immigration 
control by Western countries.  
The following regression estimates the impact of net migration flows4 on economic growth.  
GR =  CONST. + CONTR. VAR. + M(3.08lgY – 9.08),  (6) 
 where Y is  PPP GDP per capita in 1975, M – net inflow of migrants in 2000. Coefficients are 
significant at 10% level. 
    Equation (6) implies that for countries with PPP GDP of less than 10% of US level of 1975 
(level of Bolivia and Cote d’Ivoire, lgY = 2.95), the impact of the immigration on growth was 
negative. To put it differently, migrants coming to poor countries were probably less educated than 
the rest of the population, so then inflow of migrants lowered rather than increased the level of 
human capital. When a country develops the net outflow turns out to be more and more costly. On 
the contrary, immigration to rich countries provided them with a “brain gain” that outweighed the 
negative impact on growth associated with the increase in population growth rates. 
                                                          
4 Net migration flows are measured as the net inflow of migrants in 2000 as a % of total population of receiving 
country (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002). Although other variables are for the period of 1975-99, 
unfortunately we were not able to find data on net migration for developing countries in the same period. 
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    It may well be that mass emigration from Europe played a crucial role in the transition to the 
modern growth regime from a Malthusian regime. The latter was characterized by the growth of 
population that was “eating up” all the potential increases in income per capita resulting from 
technological change (Galor, Weil, 2000).  When technological progress accelerated in the 19th 
century, but the population growth rates still remained high and growing (0.6% in 1820-70) 
because the demographic transition has not yet occurred, mass migration to North America helped 
to alleviate pressure on the scarce resource – land, and to avoid diminishing returns (Pomeranz, 
2000). Today the inability of low income  countries to “export” unskilled labor to the West may be 
keeping them in a demographic trap where all available investment are spent on creating new jobs 
for the rapidly growing population. At other hand, "brain drain" from a middle income country 
may be very costly as well. 
    In short, the North and the South may have conflicting migration objectives: the former is 
interested in attracting migrants who are highly endowed with human and other forms of capital, 
and restrict entry of migrants with limited endowments; the latter would like to stem the flight of 
human and other forms of capital, and would prefer free emigration of unskilled labor as a partial 
solution to poverty5 (Schiff, 1997).  Bhagwati and Hamada (1974) proposed a tax on emigrants, 
with that tax levied by the receiving (developed country) party and transmitted in one form or 
other to the sending (developing) country. This tax cannot be levied by developing countries 
unilaterally without violating freedom of movement, so there is not much they can do without the 
cooperation of the West.  
  International organizations that deal with migration issues (UN International Labour 
Organization, and United Nations Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs) should work out appropriate North-South agreement on free movement of people 
including a system of compensations for brain drain.  
 
 
 
                                                          
5 The other effect of migration that is usually omitted  from the theoretical analysis is remittances of migrants to 
their home countries. Today the amount of remittances by migrant workers to their countries of origin ($80 
billion, according to the World Bank) exceeds the total official development assistance of all Western world (50 
billion a year).   
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7. Stages of development and economic policies 
   It was demonstrated above how rational tariff policy, FER accumulation, FDI, technology 
transfer, and migration policies have to depend on productivity and institutional indicators of a 
country. There are a number of other policies that were studied in a similar context. For example, it 
may be argued that, under poor investment climate and strong international competition, only large 
companies may serve as an engine of economic growth.   Therefore, at some stage, this companies 
merit to be supported by the state even if such a support weakens competition. All East Asian 
tigers followed this policy.  In Japan 4 major zaibatsu, powerful family-based merchant groups that 
were transformed into holding companies in the Taisho period (1912-26), controlled in 1945 25% 
of capital in industry, trade, finance and transportation (10 largest zaibatsu – 35% of capital). In 
1945-50, the American occupation authorities dissolved zaibatsu. However, the major pre-war 
zaibatsu (Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitoto) reemerged in the form of reorganized business groups, 
so that by the late 1980s six  major business groups accounted for about 15% of the value of 
shipments of all non-financial corporations (Lee, 1998). In South Korea in the 1970s rapid growth 
was going hand in hand with the increase in the share of monopolistic and oligopolistic markets  
(Lee (1998)). Fast growth of big corporations is observed in modern China as well, large firms are 
supported by China governments (Nolan (1996)). An explanation of this pattern of development 
may be found in Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti (2002b).   
   The Environmental Kuznets Curve, an inverted U-shaped relationship between income and CO2 
emissions (Panayotou, Peterson, Sachs (2000)) is a clear demonstration of the fact that rational 
environmental policy is different for developed and developing countries.   
  Similar argument can be made with respect to labor standards (safety, child labor, etc.). Increases 
in mortality due to the reduction of income resulting from the prohibition to use child labor may be 
a too high price to pay. It is not occasional that these standards arisen in comparatively rich 
economies (Chang (2000), Kitching, 2001)6.  
      In view of results described above it is useful to differentiate among four stages of 
development: (1) initial modernization (industrialization) stage; (2) stage  of initialization of export 
oriented growth; (3) stage of accelerated development; (4) developed market stage.  
                                                          
6 We do not touch here a huge set of related problems concerning institutional reforms - privatization, price 
liberalization, tax and financial sector reforms, etc. A rational choice of new institutions, sequencing and  
methods of their building also depend on the level of county development.  
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   At the initial stage a backward economy starts to modernize its industrial production and  create 
new industries. Modern machinery and equipment, as well as technology are purchased abroad. 
The most important externality at this stage is the one associated with imports of machinery and 
technology, so rational economic policy should be aimed at facilitating imports of machinery and 
equipment and protecting domestic consumer goods industries.  Such a policy could use, as 
instruments, low import duties for investment goods, subsidies for imports of machinery, support 
to firms importing technology, high import duties for consumer goods and overvalued exchange 
rate to facilitate imports. The average size of the enterprises increases at this stage of initial 
industrialization, and it makes sense to provide benefits to large companies.    The initial 
industrialization stage is similar (and sometimes even coincides) with the period of recovery from 
the recession caused by wars and revolutions, as was the case in South Korea in the 1950s or in 
Russia in the 1920s.    As the domestic industrial production expands at the first stage, import 
externality weakens, whereas domestic industrial production is constraint by the limited size of the 
national market. The access to export markets becomes crucial – export externality (learning from 
international experiences in technology, management and marketing) starts to predominate and this 
is where the second stage starts.    Countries that managed to reap fully the benefits of the second 
stage of export-oriented growth used a variety of selective and non-selective instruments7 to 
promote exports of industrial goods – direct state support of reconstruction of large enterprises, 
indicative planning, export subsidies and import tariffs, state sponsored development banks and 
credits to export oriented industries, undervaluation of the exchange rate via accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves, not to speak about general government financing of investment into 
infrastructure and human capital8.  
   Not all countries used these measures, but all fast growing countries resorted to at least some of 
these measures at the second, export-oriented stage of their development.  Simultaneously, market 
infrastructure was created and decentralization of the economy was started.  
    If fast growth is reached it makes possible to accelerate institutional reforms. In fact, they are 
necessary to support fast development. At the third stage, direct state interference in the economy 
has to be diminished, non-selective instruments (like FER accumulation) should substitute for 
                                                          
7 It makes sense to characterize an instrument by its degree of selectivity. 
8 Import tariffs and non-tariff barriers are used at the first stage of import substitution modernization, as well as 
at the second stage of export-oriented growth.  The difference is that at the second stage protection of domestic 
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selective ones, and foreign trade and financial markets may be gradually deregulated. This is a 
time to particularly care on support of small enterprises.  
   The fourth stage of developed market is characterized by the ability of the economy to maintain 
the optimal share of external trade in GDP by itself, without the interference of the government. 
Industrial policy (except for providing public goods, such as infrastructure, education, fundamental 
R&D, etc.) is thus loosing its “magic” ability to speed up economic development. Most of the 
selective instruments that were widely used at the previous two stages are phased out and used 
only in extraordinary situations. At this stage, regular countercyclical macroeconomic policy 
becomes the cornerstone of government economic regulation. 
   The four- stage picture described above is just a hypothesis. It is supported, however, by the 
histories of successful catching up cases. Students of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and China divide their 
development into periods that roughly coincides with our stages (Cho et al (1996), Nam (1995), 
Hayami (1996), Qian (1999)). All these countries came through import substitution stage, then 
used active state policies to promote export, and gradually decentralized their economies at the 
stage of fast growth.  
   Our econometric findings may be also considered as supportive. First, we have shown that for a 
number of policies switching points really exist.  Second, we have found that the effect of tariff 
policy diminishes in the process of catching up, and switching point is less than 50% of US GDP 
per capita level, whereas, for reserve accumulation, switching point is larger  (about 65%). We 
demonstrated also that good investment climate is a prerequisite for positive influence of FDI. This 
result supports recommendations do not liberalize capital markets too early (Stiglitz ( 2000)).  
Besides, it was corroborated that technology imitation is useful for growth at lower stage even if a 
country does not have its own R$D sector. 
    Thus, to ensure successful development the government is supposed to follow a non-trivial 
strategy of changing the policy every time the economy enters the new stage of development. The 
art of the policymakers is not to stick to a particular set of “good policies” but to change the policy 
so that it is most adequate to changing targets of development. Otherwise the economy gets into 
underdevelopment trap.  Not surprisingly, only a handful of countries were able to stand up to the 
challenge of switching the gears at the right time. Many more countries missed growth 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
industry is supplemented by measures promoting export   In particularly, protection is given to domestic 
exporters.  
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opportunities: USSR and India of the 1950s-1980s, as well as many Latin America countries failed 
to abandon the import substitution policies and excess government involvement, whereas African 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s and transition economies in the 1990s tried to copy directly and 
straightforwardly policies and institutions of developed countries. In both cases results were 
disappointing – inequalities increased,  the 
fight for the greater share of the national pie intensified, and production stagnated or even 
dropped9.   
8. About a New World Economic Order  
 The stages of development theory suggested above implies that rules and norms of interactions 
between developed and developing worlds have to be changed, and the system of assistance should 
be substantially improved.     
  First, the international expert society has to recognize that the concepts of proper (correct, good) 
political and economic institutions and policies are conditional and depend on a level of national 
development. It is a very challenging task to work out a list of differentiated prescriptions that may 
be followed by countries at different stages of development. In particularly, this is important to 
improve the system of international financial assistance.  
   Second, industrial policy, including the use of direct and indirect subsidies, tariffs, price and 
wage restrictions, foreign exchange reserves accumulations, etc. may be necessary to support fast 
economic growth in developing countries where markets are distorted whereas developed countries 
may need to resort to these instruments in exceptional cases only. WTO and other international 
trade organizations as well as international financial institutions (IMF, WB, EBRD, etc.) have to 
take this asymmetry into account.  
   Third, terms of patent and copyrights protection have to be differentiated for a broad spectrum of 
innovation dependently on the development level of a country.   
  Fourth, an international agreement to compensate developing countries for brain drain has to be 
worked out.  
  Fifth, the mechanism of the international development assistance has to be reformed. The 
situation when the same people develop programs of reforms and make decisions on their 
                                                          
9 This difficulty is clearly demonstrated by Brazilian economic history. Brazilian governments used import 
substitution policy in 1940-1964 and also in 1974-1990, whereas in 1964 - 1974 as well as in 1990-1997, export 
oriented policy prevailed. In 1974 and also in 1997 Brazilian economy experienced economic crises (Baer 
(2001)).  
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financing may create conflict of interests. A new assistance system has to be built to avoid this 
possibility. Assume, for example, that each country gets a financial quota for improving its own 
institutions, and may suggest an international group of specialists to develop programs of 
institutional reforms. Assume also that an international financial organization (IMF?) may approve 
the candidates or not but can not influence on the program directly. It is quite possible that this 
system will prove to be more effective than current one. 
   These would be some elements of a New World Economic Order that has to decrease the gap 
between developed and developing world.  
9. Conclusions. 
     It seems to be not reasonable to apply the modern Western patterns of tradeoffs between 
different development goals (wealth, education, life expectancy, equality, environmental standards, 
human rights, etc.) to less developed countries. Policies that prohibit child labor, for instance, may 
be an unaffordable luxury for developing countries, where the choice is not between putting a child 
to school or into a factory shop, but between allowing the child to work or to die from hunger. The 
marginal cost of adopting stricter regulations in such areas as environment and human rights 
(reproductive rights, work conditions and safety standards, children’s and prisoners’ rights) in 
developing countries in terms of deterioration of other developmental indicators (life expectancy, 
consumption) may be prohibitively high.  
  The past experience of now-developed economies, more recent experience of successful 
developing countries, econometric calculations, and theoretical arguments imply that different 
stages of economic development require different sets of economic policies.  
    However in our interdependent world “good policies” for developing countries, whether its trade 
protectionism or control over short-term capital flows, in most instances cannot be pursued 
unilaterally, without the co-operation of the West or at least without some kind of understanding 
on the part of the rich countries. The international society has to recognize that the non-decreasing 
gap between developing and developed worlds is dangerous for both of them. To shorten this gap 
the current economic order, norms of trade agreements and the structure of assistance institutions 
have to be substantially improved.   
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Table1. Some macroeconomic indicators for rapidly growing countries in 1960-99 
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Countries with average annual growth rate of GDP per capita of over 4% 
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Korea, Rep. 5,82 14,17 5,89 18,21 (192,11 58,23 -0,07 25,08 38,9 27,93
Singapore 5,87 72,76 60,55 90,52 (194,76 93,93 6,80 163,66 41,96 (1
96) 
34,57
Thailand 4,51 14,44 14,75 27,97 (194,47 41,69 1,61 41,63 26 27,98
Countries with average annual growth rate of GDP per capita of 3 to 4%%         
Hungary 3,11 27,59 (114,18 (122,67 (193,52 36,05 4,27 38,06 22,44 (128,79
 23
99) 99) (1990-99) 99) 
Greece 3,36 9,90 6,83 15,64 
(1994) 
3,86 69,99 1,08 14,42 10,76 27,02
Indonesia 3,43 19,09 (1
99) 
6,65 (1967 23,89 (193,36 42,54 0,93 (1990 22,04 19,9 22,34
Ireland 3,89 -11,22 14,61 22,51 (192,46 93,99 2,08 49,20 57,9 18,71
Luxembourg 3,06    -3,61 (1
99) 
2,10 (1984 4,29 (1980,03 123,23  103,7614,4 18,43
Malaysia 3,91 24,55 21,26 42,13 (194,19 59,12 4,36 58,80 71,1 27,83
Mauritius 3,30 6,94 14,53 32,32 (192,74 42,99 0,50 50,29 36,9 22,83
Norway 3,03 6,94 10,57 22,56 (193,91 125,96 -0,51 38,19 2,22 22,83
Portugal 3,83 -9,31 26,77 51,40 (192,86 56,78 0,98 24,98 15,28 (1
98) 
24,66
Spain 3,31 1,80 8,18 13,06 (195,25 80,05 0,61 15,56 19,2 23,13
* In 1960-84 the ratio increased by 4,09 p.p.       Source: WDI.  
 
Fig. 1. Average real exchange rate versus the US $ (Year 12 = 100%)  in fast 
growing developing economies, year "0" denotes the point of take-off
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